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Introduction
Since the 1993 Oslo Accords through to the 
present, the role of the Palestinian Authority’s 
(PA) security forces has transformed according 
to the evolution of political developments, 
conflict dynamics, as well as changes in the 
composition of Palestinian leadership, its 
strategies, and security doctrines. Those trans-
formations remained within the framework 
of the Oslo Accords and its security arrange-
ments, which intended to protect Israeli secu-
rity (Khan 2010), and to maintain law, order, 
and stability in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (OPT). 
This article provides a contextual analy-
sis of the evolution and reform processes 
of Palestinian security forces over the last 
two decades. It argues that the Oslo Accords 
and Arafatism (Yasser Arafat’s style of gov-
ernance) saw an increase in security force 
personnel but the proliferation was associ-
ated with higher levels of insecurity and 
coupled with high levels of corruption, 
patronage-based politics and personalised 
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rule. Furthermore, this article highlights 
that while the state-building project in the 
occupied West Bank under the premiership 
of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad between 
2007 and 2013 (Fayyadism paradigm) meant 
to reverse the negative outcomes of the Oslo 
Accords and Arafatism, it resulted in rising 
tensions between the PA’s security forces and 
the armed resistance groups. This article will 
show that this tension under the Fayyadism 
paradigm created better stability for Israel 
but not better security for the Palestinian 
people. It is also illustrates that despite the 
security reform processes under Fayyadism, 
the transformations, reforms, and paradigm 
shifts led to a deepening of authoritarianism 
in the OPT.
The evolution of the Palestinian security 
forces underwent three major phases: The 
Oslo Accords Phase-Arafatism (1993–1999); 
The Second Intifada Phase (2000–2006); and 
The Fayyadism Phase (2007–2013). Figure 1 
below provides a thematic and chronological 
evolution of Palestinian security forces, and 
the main characteristics of each phase. This 
article is structured in chronological order: 
it starts by addressing the tensions between 
state-building and national liberation pro-
jects, and their impact on the evolution of 
Palestinian security forces, focusing in par-
ticular on the proliferation of the security 
forces, the complex dynamics of corruption, 
and Arafat’s personalised style of govern-
ance. The second section discusses the road 
to reform, the dominance of armed groups in 
the security realm, and the clashes between 
the different security paradigms. Lastly, it 
reflects on the security model of Fayyadism, 
discusses its essence, technical successes, 
and national failures. 
Building Security Forces: State-Building 
vs. National Liberation (1993–1999)
During this phase, the process of building-up 
the PA’s security forces was neither inclusive 
nor transparent, but rather fraught with cor-
ruption and nepotism, and exposed to inside-
outside leadership clashes (Lia 2006; Khatib 
2010). This resulted in the proliferation of 
security forces, increased internal conflicts 
and competition, the absence of a unified 
security strategy or chain of command, 
and a failure to protect the Palestinian 
people. This failure to protect Palestinians 
was partly due to the lack of expertise and 
professionalism of the security forces, but 
more importantly it was the consequence 
of the Oslo Accords’ design (Khan 2005) and 
the failure to resolve the dilemma of state-
building versus national liberation. Meyers 
(2000: 91) argued that, ‘it is an anomaly in 
the Palestinian case, created by the agree-
ments, that the functions of the Palestinian 
security forces are very specifically limited, 
but for the interests of an outside state, not 
to protect Palestinian citizens.’ Therefore, as 
was argued by Agha and Khalidi (2005: 88), 
the PA was ‘torn between reining in armed 
elements and thus providing security to its 
adversary Israel, and indulging those ele-
ments and thus participating in the struggle 
for national liberation.’ At the same time, 
the PA has been totally incapable of defend-
ing its people in the sense of actively con-
fronting Israeli armed actions or incursions 
onto Palestinian soil, or raising the cost of 
the occupation (Agha and Khalidi 2005). 
The legacy of corruption, absence of profes-
sionalism, and Arafat’s personalised style of 
governance allowed the Palestinian people 
to perceive the PA’s security forces as inef-
fective and unreliable (Lia 2007).
The Origins 
The 1994 Cairo Agreement stipulated the 
establishment of a ‘strong police force’ 
with a maximum of 9,000 recruits (7,000 
from abroad and 2,000 from the occupied 
territories) to guarantee ‘public order and 
internal security within the jurisdiction of 
the Palestinian Authority’ (Lia 2006: 96), 
and it lead to the establishment of various 
Palestinian-Israeli joint security bodies. Ten 
days after signing the Cairo Agreement, the 
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers and 
the returnees (Al-‘aedin) started to return 
back to Gaza and Jericho to set up the PA’s 
security forces and institutions. The 1995 
Tartir: The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993–2013 Art. 46, page 3 
Fi
gu
re
 1
: T
he
m
at
ic
 a
nd
 C
hr
on
ol
og
ic
al
 E
vo
lu
ti
on
 o
f P
al
es
ti
ni
an
 S
ec
ur
it
y 
Fo
rc
es
 1
99
3–
20
13
.
Tartir: The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993–2013Art. 46, page 4 
Oslo II increased the number of policemen to 
30,000 (12,000 for the West Bank and 18,000 
for Gaza); however, by then the Palestinian 
police force had already reached 22,000 
in Gaza and Jericho alone. In 1995, Arafat 
arrived in the West Bank and Palestinian 
forces were deployed in ‘Areas (A)’,1 touring 
in the Palestinian cities in their PLA military 
uniform in an act of revolutionary victory 
(Frisch 2008: 86–88).
In 1998, the number of security personnel 
reached between 30,000 and 40,000, increas-
ing to 50,000 by 2000, and 53,000 by 2003 
(Le More 2008). By 2004, there were more 
than 15 different security bodies operating 
in the occupied territories. This proliferation 
of security forces urged Ramadan Shallah, 
the leader of Islamic Jihad, to argue in 1996: 
‘Arafat has so many intelligence services in 
the self-rule areas that if you open your win-
dow, Preventive Security peeps in; if you open 
your door, the Presidential Security Service 
comes in; if you go out to your garden, you 
bump into Military Intelligence; and if you 
go out to the street, you come across General 
Intelligence’ (Cited in Lia 2006: 307). While 
Edward Said stated that ‘Arafat established 
several security forces, five of them were 
intelligence services all spying on each other’ 
(Said 1995: xxxi).
Proliferation, Patronage and Corruption
The proliferation of the security forces did 
not occur incidentally. It was a tool that Arafat 
used to maintain control over the security 
establishment and to enforce his approach 
of divide-to-rule. He created a system in 
which the heads of security forces reported 
to him exclusively. In turn, they themselves 
were in rivalry in their operations, often lead-
ing to bloody clashes. This mode of person-
alised governance and patronage led to the 
establishment of self-interested groups that 
resisted reform. Arafat, up until 2003, refused 
to use the word ‘reform’ preferring, at the best 
of times, the word ‘development.’ Arafat once 
stated: ‘no one can intervene between me 
and my children’ in reference to the security 
forces leadership (Al-Shu’aibi 2012: 5). This 
personalised style of governance was inter-
related with corruption and nepotism, and 
as such generated negative consequences 
on the security forces’ operations. Not only 
did it damage the forces’ reputation, but it 
also impeded the security and safety of the 
Palestinian people. This de-institutionalized 
mode of governance was coupled with an 
intra-Palestinian conflict between the inside 
and outside leaderships. Additionally, there 
were problematic recruitment policies, as 
well as managerial and administrative weak-
nesses, which ultimately impeded the effec-
tiveness of these forces and the services they 
provided.
One of the most striking manifestations 
of corruption was the distribution of cash 
salaries. The head of the security force (Jihaz) 
would visit Arafat’s office, receive a bag full 
of cash; soldiers were supposed to queue up 
to receive their cash in hand (Le More 2008). 
This phase also featured the emergence of a 
‘gun culture’ in the Palestinian society (Lia 
2006; Najib and Friedrich 2007), whereby 
it was common to see men in plain clothes 
walking the streets with a gun on their side, 
ready to be used for the resolution of any 
small problem. The matter in which the PA 
forces dealt with such chaos and violence 
was also corrupted. The corruption dynam-
ics expanded to reach both procurement and 
inventory systems, as well as the benefits 
systems with the misuse of resources, pow-
ers, and public facilities. All of these dynam-
ics were felt and seen by the public, which 
intensified the legitimacy gap between the 
PA forces and people.
Additionally, there had been an absence of 
effective mechanisms to ensure inter-agency 
cooperation, which resulted in a waste of 
resources and inefficient performance. There 
was no space for developing effective civil-
democratic oversight or accountability mech-
anisms, particularly since the Palestinian 
Legislative Council had been neglected and 
bypassed due to Arafat’s mode of govern-
ance. The executive branch of the Authority 
was dominating the realm in the absence of 
effective judiciary or legislative branches. 
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The corruption thread was also reflected 
at the political level, which witnessed a 
divide between the Palestinian inside and 
outside leaderships. This divide proved to 
be problematic when the returnees arrived 
to the West Bank and Gaza and established 
the security forces. These forces and their 
leadership were returning from exile, an 
imposition that made the local Palestinians 
uncomfortable. Many felt that these security 
forces were ‘theirs’ not ‘ours,’ and the last 
thing local Palestinians wished for was to 
replace the foreign occupation with a local 
one (Lia 2007). Palestinians were not expect-
ing practices such as the Black Friday in Gaza 
in November 1994, when Palestinian police 
fired live ammunition at civilian demonstra-
tors killing 13 and wounding another 200, 
or the arresting and torturing of the opposi-
tion (Frisch 2008). Hence, inclusiveness was 
a challenge from the beginning.
This lack of inclusiveness was reinforced by 
recruitment policies, since the vast majority 
of the recruited security personnel belonged 
to one political party, Fatah. Such policies 
served to ‘de-legitimize the whole institution 
and [were] not viewed as neutral national 
institutions by the public’ (Al-Shu’aibi 2012: 2). 
The recruitment process lacked transpar-
ency and accountability. This meant that 
wasta (nepotism) was the marker of merit 
rather than actual training or skill set. As 
pointed out in 1997 by Mohammed Dahlan, 
then the PA Preventive Security Chief in 
Gaza: ‘We have 36,000 people of whom we 
only need 10,000. This huge number is a bur-
den on the PA and a burden on the security 
organ. We view it as a social issue because I 
cannot tell a prisoner who spent 15 years in 
jail that I have no job for him’ (Cited in Le 
More 2008: 78). Thirteen years later in sum-
mer 2010, I asked Dahlan about the progress 
of the PA security forces, he told me: ‘the 
major problem for our misery now and the 
defeat in Gaza in 2007 is attributed to prior-
itizing quantity over quality.’2
On the other hand, technically, the PA’s 
security forces fulfilled many of their obliga-
tions dictated by the Oslo Accords, as they 
engaged in a process of dismantling the 
Palestinian ‘infrastructure of terror’ as well 
as protecting Israeli security. The PA forces, 
along with their duties to enforce law and 
order, targeted, arrested, and harassed many 
Palestinian members of the opposition. They 
also conducted a ‘controlling campaign’ to 
regulate, license, and organise the possession 
of arms. The PA forces managed to ‘impress’ 
the Israelis, despite their lack of expertise 
(Friedrich and Luethold 2007). This partially 
explains why Israel and the international 
community were silent about, and complicit 
in, sustaining the network of corruption 
and perpetuating the absence of reform in 
Palestinian security institutions. By 1999 and 
from the perspective of the PA’s supporters, 
the mere existence of the PA’s security forces, 
despite all the challenges, was their biggest 
success. 
This phase was characterised by a clash 
between two parallel projects: state-building 
versus national liberation. While the former 
implied building the institutional underpin-
nings and capacities for the interim author-
ity to transform into the statehood phase 
on the 1967 borders by 1999, the latter 
assumed that that the PA security forces will 
be an extension to the PLO’s PLA and there-
fore engage in a national liberation endeav-
our of historical Palestine based on 1948 
borders. These are two parallel ventures: one 
implemented by state-like institutions and 
the other by a national liberation movement. 
These two contradictory approaches meant 
that the tensions that emerged between the 
two approaches were also reflected in the 
style of governance and the security doctrine 
of the Palestinian leadership. These tensions, 
in addition to the deep distortions in the evo-
lution of the PA forces caused by the asym-
metry of power relations, resulted in a mixed 
record concerning the PA’s security forces’ 
effectiveness.
However, Arafat’s personalised style of rule 
and the complex network of corruption were 
not the only reasons to blame and such an 
explanation would be ‘overtly simplistic, if not 
disingenuous’ as argued by Le More (2008: 82). 
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Any contextualised analysis of the effec-
tiveness of the PA’s security forces should 
include a review of the complexity of the 
internal and external dimensions of the 
growth of authoritarianism and patronage-
based system in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Robinson argued that the PA became an 
authoritarian polity because the exiled lead-
ership of the PLO had to recapture and cen-
tralise power, thereby marginalising local 
political leaders (1997). Brynen argued that 
the Oslo Accords managed to create new 
Palestinian elite that sustained their opera-
tion with a framework of neo-patrimonial 
style of governance (Brynen 2000). Khan 
et al. (2004) argued that Israel’s intention 
was to create a ‘client state’ upon which it 
could continue to exert considerable control 
and leverage through the rents it distributed 
to the PA, which was coupled with territo-
rial fragmentation and a strategy of asym-
metric containment. Therefore, the tenets 
of the Oslo Accords and Israeli policies were 
major factors in the breakdown of the PA 
security’s effectiveness, as the next section 
demonstrates.
Destroying and Reforming 
Palestinian Security Infrastructure 
(2000–2006)
A new round of violence began after the fail-
ures of Camp David and Taba Peace Summits 
in 2000. This was in addition to the infa-
mous visit of Ariel Sharon, the leader of 
the Israeli Likud political party at the time, 
to Al-Haram Al-Sharif (Temple Mount) in 
September 2000 accompanied by 1,000 secu-
rity guards. In the five days that followed his 
visit, 47 Palestinians were killed, 1,855 were 
injured, and five Israelis were killed. The sec-
ond intifada erupted, and the PA security 
forces actively engaged. This intifada took on 
a militarised character from the Palestinian 
side as well, and all armed resistance groups 
intensified their operations. The newly estab-
lished Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades were 
influential and controversial, having acquired 
substantive resources from Arafat and the PA 
leadership.
Security Vacuum
On the 12th of October 2000, a major inci-
dent in Ramallah signalled the PA’s security 
forces engagement in the intifada. The PA 
police stopped two Israeli soldiers in plain 
clothes and dragged them to the main police 
station where they were beaten, stabbed, 
and killed. This incident deepened the 
Israeli security establishment’s mistrust of 
the PA forces, resulting in the reconsidera-
tion of their relationship. On the same day, 
Israel launched airstrikes against PA security 
targets, completely destroying the security 
premises. In March 2002 Israel launched 
Operation Defensive Shield, and this mili-
tary operation caused massive destruction 
and losses in both human and economic 
measures. Palestinian security personnel 
were detained and disarmed en masse, their 
facilities destroyed, and PA civil institutions 
ransacked. The destruction of physical infra-
structure is estimated to have cost the econ-
omy $3.5 billion, equivalent to 30 per cent of 
pre-2000 capital stock (UNCTAD 2005). The 
destruction of the PA’s security apparatus 
and facilities exceeded $38.5 million in the 
West Bank and $34.5 million in Gaza Strip up 
to early 2002 (World Bank 2004).
With their diminished capacity, the activi-
ties of the security forces became more hap-
hazard. Traffic police in civilian attire, the 
detainment of thieves by the city governor 
in his own home in the absence of prison 
facilities, became common occurrences. The 
destruction of the PA forces’ capabilities, 
capacities, and resources created a gap that 
was soon filled by armed groups, including 
Hamas. This security vacuum filled by non-
PA security actors imposed new challenges 
to security provision and governance, as 
Palestinian people perceived these actors as 
more trustworthy and legitimate than the 
PA-actors (PASSIA and DCAF 2006). 
A national survey conducted in 2005 by the 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control 
of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Graduate 
Institute of International and Development 
Studies (IUED) revealed that 34 per cent 
of the interviewees had great trust in the 
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Al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas), and 29 per 
cent had great trust in the Saraya Al-Quds 
(Islamic Jihad), as opposed to 21 per cent 
in the Civil Police and 18 per cent in the 
Preventive Security (DCAF and IUED 2005). 
In another national survey (a sample of 1,800 
Palestinians) conducted by DCAF in 2006, 
more than 70 per cent of the respondents 
trusted non-PA forces very much or to some 
extent, while the trust in the PA security 
forces remained shaky. The most trustwor-
thy groups were the military wings of Hamas 
(79 per cent) and Islamic Jihad (78 per cent), 
confirmed when surveyed on their views of 
how the PA should deal with armed groups. 
A majority of 86 per cent favoured dialogue 
and consensus over the use of force. Seventy-
six per cent of the respondents rejected the 
use of force against the militias (DCAF 2006). 
Figure 2 introduces the statutory (PA) and 
non-statutory (non-PA) security forces. It 
divides the PA’s statutory security forces into 
internal security forces and national security 
forces (PA’s ‘Proto-army’), and combined they 
are comprised of some fifteen active bod-
ies. By contrast, the non-statutory security 
forces and groups are mainly associated with 
political factions, social movements, families 
and clans, popular protection committees, 
and other informal bodies that are embed-
ded in Palestinian traditions, and combined 
they are comprised of some thirteen active 
groups. The chart also introduces the major 
international security actors. 
The Road to Reform
The rising influence of non-PA actors was a 
threat to Israeli security; therefore, under 
Israeli and international pressure, the PA was 
forced to start a reform project for its secu-
rity sector and forces (Sayigh and Shikaki 
1999). On the 23rd of June 2002, one day 
before President Bush delivered a speech on 
his vision for peace in the Middle East, the 
PA announced its 100-Day Reform Plan.3 The 
100-Day Plan called for a ‘comprehensive 
reform throughout the government, renewal 
of the legitimacy of elected officials through 
democratic elections, rearranged ministerial 
structures, and reinforced separation of pow-
ers’ (UNDP 2003: 3). It aimed to reduce the 
power of the president, increase the power of 
the parliament, institute the rule of law, and 
increase the scrutiny of Palestinian finances 
(Turner 2009) as a prerequisite for peace and 
state recognition (ICG 2002, 2004). In the 
domain of ‘public security’, the 100-Day Plan 
aimed to restructure the Ministry of Interior 
(MoI) and modernise its apparatus; attach 
the Preventive Security Services, the Police 
and the Civil Defence to the MoI; and acti-
vate the role of the MoI and its apparatuses 
in the enforcement of court rulings. It also 
aimed to reinforce loyalty to the Authority; 
end the role of the security services in civil-
ian affairs; and give utmost attention to the 
needs of the population, whose support and 
cooperation would be acquired by inducing 
law and order (PA 2002).
By 2002, the role of the CIA was expanded, 
and the Quartet and its International Task 
Force on Palestinian Reform were estab-
lished as international bodies to supervise 
the Palestinian security sector reform. With 
the proliferation of international control-
ling bodies, scholars argued that Palestine 
became under (financial) international trus-
teeship and lost any kind of ownership on 
the reform processes (Khalidi 2005; Brown 
2010). As argued by Turner (2009: 568), ‘the 
PA, still reeling from the ‘shock and awe’ 
of Operation Defensive Shield and lack-
ing the resources to rebuild what had been 
destroyed, had little choice but to take the 
shock doctors’ medicine’, This was further 
entrenched by the launch of the Road Map 
in 2003 by the Quartet.4 Phase I of the Road 
Map demanded the PA to undertake ‘visible 
efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and 
restrain individuals and groups conducting 
and planning violent attacks on Israelis any-
where’ (Road Map 2003: 2).
The plan demanded that ‘rebuilt and refo-
cused Palestinian Authority security appa-
ratus’ had to confront ‘all those engaged 
in terror’ and dismantle ‘the terrorist 
capabilities and infrastructure’ (Road Map 
2003). The text stipulated that this included 
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confiscating ‘illegal weapons’, and ‘consoli-
dating security authority, free of associa-
tion with terror and corruption’ (Road Map 
2003). In other words, the PA’s security sec-
tor was forced to: combat terrorism; appre-
hend suspects; outlaw incitement; collect all 
illegal weapons; provide Israel with a list of 
Palestinian police recruits; and report pro-
gress to the United States (Agha and Khalidi 
2005). This, according to Friedrich and 
Luethold (2007) meant that the Palestinian 
security reform had,
remained, in essence, an externally-
controlled process, driven by the 
national security interests of Israel 
and the United States, and charac-
terised by very limited ownership on 
the part of Palestinian society . . . the 
primary Israeli and American inter-
est is to transform the Palestinian 
security sector into an instrument in 
their fight against terror . . . [and] the 
Palestinian security interests play at 
best a subordinate role in the design 
and implementation of this trans-
formation process (Friedrich and 
Luethold 2007: 192).
These reform plans forced Arafat to appoint 
Mahmoud Abbas as the PA’s first Prime 
Minister, and a loyalist as the first Minister 
of Interior in 2003. Salam Fayyad was 
appointed as finance minister as per the 
World Bank’s conditionality, and as far as 
security forces were concerned, he created 
a single treasury account and enhanced 
financial transparency. This meant that after 
a decade of its establishment, the PA’s secu-
rity personnel were able to receive their sal-
aries through bank transfers; however, these 
reforms were superficial. Abbas remained 
Prime Minister for less than six months 
because he was marginalised, and within 
five months, four Ministers of Interiors were 
appointed. Thus, internal power dynamics 
dominated the reform scene (Friedrich and 
Luethold 2007).
Clashing Paradigms 
The inconsistencies between the security 
reform efforts and the challenges posed by 
the dominance of non-PA groups continued 
to accelerate until the death of Arafat in 
November 2004. With Arafat’s death, a new 
security doctrine started to emerge. In his 
presidential victory speech in 2005, Abbas 
declared his determination to establish the 
PA’s monopoly of violence as the main pri-
ority, and to implement the electoral slo-
gan ‘one law, one gun, one authority’.5 In 
an immediate reaction to this renewal of 
the security sector reform approach, Abbas 
forced the Palestinian factions, including 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to agree in Cairo 
on a period of calm (Tahdi’a). This entailed 
a temporary ceasefire based on reciproc-
ity. The international community reacted to 
this through organizing the London Meeting 
on Supporting the Palestinian Authority. In 
that international conference, the PA prom-
ised to ‘create the conditions conducive 
to the peace process with the immediate 
objective of restoring internal law and order 
and preventing violence’ (London Meeting 
2005: 4), while the international commu-
nity promised to provide advice and assis-
tance on legal, structural, and organisational 
aspects to strengthen the security sector, 
through establishing the European Union 
Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police 
Support (EUPOL COPPS) and the United 
States Security Coordinator (USSC).
As a consequence for this speedy entry 
into security sector reform processes, modest 
progress was made that can be categorised 
at five levels: (i) structural reorganisation 
through merging numerous security forces, 
sending long-standing security command-
ers into early retirement, disbanding the 
Special Forces and the Special Security, and 
reactivating the National Security Council; 
(ii) commence working on a White Paper 
to establish a normative-legal framework 
for the security sector; (iii) initiation of the 
Civil Police reform programme with the 
establishment of the EUPOL COPPS to assist 
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the PA in improving its law-enforcement 
capacity; (iv) the PA embarked on tenta-
tive Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) processes, such as dis-
mantling Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades; and, (v) 
improving the capabilities of the PA security 
forces through better human resource man-
agement, increase in salaries and benefits, 
and local and regional training. Additionally, 
the MoI banned the PA’s security bodies from 
receiving foreign aid directly and called for 
it to be channelled through the Ministry of 
Finance. The logistical and procurements 
procedures were reviewed, and an inventory 
check was developed (Friedrich and Luethold 
2008; Hussein 2007).
However, despite these transformations, 
the overall evaluation of the security reform 
process by the end of 2005 was bleak. The 
DfID (2006: 19) concluded that: 
The PA security forces lack a monopoly 
over the means of violence. Israel con-
tinues to control significant portions 
of the West Bank. Communications 
between West Bank and Gaza are dif-
ficult. Command and control of the 
Palestinian Authority Security Forces 
(PASF) is factionalised and personal-
ised. There are overlapping responsi-
bilities among the different services 
and no unifying doctrine. The security 
services have limited political sup-
port, and there is an inadequate leg-
islative framework to guide them. The 
judiciary is weak. Parliamentary and 
other forms of oversight are virtually 
non-existent.
The victory of Hamas in the 2006 parliamen-
tary elections halted this one year of reform 
(Le More 2006). The attempt to impose a new 
security doctrine led by Abbas and donors 
was put on hold until the new dynamics 
were figured out. The victory of Hamas rear-
ranged all the cards, confused all the actors, 
and challenged the PA security doctrine. This 
was mainly due to Hamas’ legacy as a non-
PA actor that provided informal but effective 
public services, including security, through 
its committees, military groups, charities, 
and institutions. However, the existing 
Fatah-PA’s security forces’ leadership refused 
to deal with Hamas-government, and there-
fore the chain of command, responsibilities, 
interests, ideologies, and approaches began 
to clash. The refusal of Fatah to accept the 
electoral defeat made the year 2006 unsta-
ble and ambiguous, and thus a new round 
of archery and negligence of citizen’s basic 
security needs emerged.
The international community’s boycott 
of the Hamas-led Palestinian government 
resulted in the inability to pay salaries to 
150,000 public employees, including the 
security forces. This led to deteriorating 
effects that further eroded the legitimacy 
and functionality of the PA institutions. 
Israel, in turn, withheld the transfer of tax 
revenues that it collects on behalf of the 
PA (UNCTAD 2005, 2006). The interna-
tional community created parallel routes 
(DeVoir and Tartir 2009) to bypass Hamas 
and continue its support for the PA and its 
security apparatus; a selective process that 
supported the moderate and pragmatic 
Fatah leadership, and excluded the rest.6 
This represented a rejection of Palestinian 
democracy and a move that went against the 
principles of good governance that fuelled 
the Palestinian divide, and created new elite 
that were viewed as credible partners for 
peace (Turner 2011). 
As a consequence for this Palestinian 
schism, the PA’s President initiated meas-
ures to keep control over security forces. 
Abbas separated the National Security 
Forces from the MoI; nominated a Chief-of-
Staff to report directly to him; appointed a 
loyal Fatah leader as the head of three inter-
nal security bodies; and, created new bod-
ies and expanded others, particularly the 
Presidential Guard (Friedrich and Luethold 
2007). In June 2006, the PLC became dys-
functional. Hamas in turn took its measures, 
first by establishing a ‘unity’ government and 
subsequently by violently taking over Gaza. 
Meanwhile, Hamas was building-up its back 
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up plans, particularly the Back-Up forces 
in Gaza, which later became the Executive 
Forces. Hamas managed to establish a strong 
military base in Gaza that combined both a 
state-like security apparatus and an armed 
resistance wing. However, in June 2007, 
violent clashes between Fatah and Hamas 
erupted and resulted in 118 casualties and 
555 injuries, which brought a new phase 
of fragmentation and instability into the 
Palestinian polity (Brown 2009). This intra-
Palestinian divide led to multi-level conse-
quences on the security sector, its structures, 
and the further steps for its reform. The 
Fayyadist paradigm, discussed in the fol-
lowing section, emerged as the way forward 
to reform the security sector and build a 
Palestinian state. 
The Fayyadism Phase: Re-Inventing 
Palestinian Security Forces (2007–
2013)
In the aftermath of the 2007 intra-Palestinian 
divide, Hamas controlled Gaza and Fatah 
controlled the West Bank. Both parties took 
parallel measures to sustain the fragmenta-
tion (Tartir 2012a). The PA President declared 
a state of emergency (Brown 2007; PCHR 
2007),7 and after dismissing the Hamas-led 
cabinet, appointed Fayyad to head an emer-
gency government. With the appointment 
of Fayyad, a new era in the Palestinian pol-
ity and style of governance had emerged. 
Fayyad, through his West Bank First 
approach,8 declared a commitment to both 
a strict reform agenda based on establishing 
a monopoly of violence by the PA security 
apparatus and the adoption of a neoliberal 
post-Washington economic agenda aimed at 
creating the institutional underpinning for a 
future Palestinian state (PA 2008, 2010a, b).
The Essence of Fayyadism 
Fayyad’s major plans (PRDP, 13th Government 
Plan, and NDP)9 spelled out a commitment 
to modernizing and professionalizing the 
Palestinian security services under the banner 
of ‘One Homeland, One Flag, and One Law.’ It 
aimed to reinvent the security forces through:
Rebuilding, restructuring and reform-
ing the security services and developing 
democratic oversight mechanisms . . . 
creating an appropriate legal and 
institutional framework; enhanc-
ing the professional and operational 
effectiveness of security forces; ensur-
ing the fiscal sustainability of the 
security forces; re-inforcing demo-
cratic governance and accountability; 
and addressing the legacies of conflict 
(e.g. unlawful ownership and use of 
weapons) (PA 2008: 38).
The ‘Security First’ approach under Fayyadism 
posited that security reform will prove that 
Palestinians are credible partners for peace 
and able to govern themselves despite the 
existence of the occupation. However, not-
withstanding the glowing rhetoric, the 
major problem that remains unsolved is 
related to the meaning of security and 
political reform in the first place. Security 
reform under Fayyad meant the creation of 
a monopoly of violence through a weapons 
cleansing process, which was conducted to 
disarm or render dysfunctional the military 
groups committed to armed resistance of 
Israeli occupation. Hence, the PA security 
plan under Fayyad has several overlapping 
elements:
Checking Hamas and its armed 
wing, the Qassam Brigades; contain-
ing Fatah-allied militants through 
co-optation and amnesty; restoring 
public order by cracking down on 
criminals; conduct security campaign 
in Nablus and Jenin; and strengthen-
ing security forces through training, 
weapons procurement and security 
reform (ICG 2008: 4).
Technical Success, National Failures
Although the Oslo Accords framework had 
not been altered in this phase, the Palestinian 
security forces became better defined. The 
international actors were able to dominate 
the reform process with their funds and 
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policy advice, stripping Palestinians of any 
level of ownership. Disarmament and secu-
rity campaigns were conducted to enforce 
law and order and collect ‘illegal’ arms, the 
destroyed security sector’s physical infra-
structure was rebuilt, strategic plans for 
the sector were drafted, and the USSC and 
EUPOL COPPS, as well as the Palestinian 
Security Academy, became the major illus-
tration of the new PA security doctrine. The 
security forces were reorganised into six 
main operational branches and two smaller 
ones, besides auxiliary services, with for-
mal control divided between the PA presi-
dency and the MoI (Friedrich and Luethold 
2007). Corruption declined in the security 
spheres, and the security personnel were 
better equipped, trained, educated, dressed, 
and compensated. Many of the ‘old security 
guards’ appointed by Arafat were discharged 
and replaced by a new security élite. This 
phase witnessed a proliferation in the num-
ber of local and foreign NGOs working in the 
security realm (Tartir 2012b). These transfor-
mations were completely dependent upon 
donors’ funds, with more than 30 per cent of 
total aid to Palestinians devoted to the secu-
rity sector (Taghdisi-Rad 2010; UNCTAD 2010). 
In technical terms, the PA’s security 
forces became professionalised, well-
trained, and engaged in daily coordina-
tion with the Israeli counterpart despite 
the existence of the asymmetry of power. 
Their technical achievements reached the 
highest levels since the establishment of 
the PA, and even won international and 
regional excellency prizes. The Palestinian 
security sector was reinvented under 
Fayyadism and an overhaul to its func-
tionality was conducted,10 which led many 
scholars to celebrate its success (Sellwood 
2009; Bröning 2011).
However, this reform process was not 
without costs, and the implications of the 
enhanced functionality of PA security forces 
on the national struggle and resistance 
against the occupation were detrimental 
(Khan 2009). The reformed security forces 
were accused of human rights violations, 
suppression of freedom of speech, and 
political affiliation (Amrov 2013). The PA has 
twice ranked lower in the Reporters Without 
Borders Press Freedom Index than any Arab 
government, and it retains a ‘note free’ rat-
ing on the Freedom House political rights 
and civil liberties index (Thrall 2010; Danin 
2011). They were accused of creating a police 
state and an authoritarian regime (Sayigh 
2011). Moreover, they were blamed for add-
ing another layer of repression, for failing 
to protect the foundation of a Palestinian 
democratic system, and for sustaining the 
occupation through their sub-contractor 
role that protected Israeli security through 
coordination mechanisms and disarmament 
process (Leech 2012). The excessive use of 
violence, torture, arbitrary detention, and 
intimidation by the PA’s security forces has 
been documented by numerous local and 
international human rights organisations 
(HRW 2008, 2010; ICG 2008, 2010; ICHR 
2010; MEM 2010; Al-Haq 2011). Further 
examples include political imprisonment, 
humiliation, torture, dismissal of public 
servants due to their political affiliation, the 
closing of Hamas-affiliated NGOs and civil 
society organisations, and money laundering 
regulation.
A 2010 International Crisis Group’s (ICG) 
report warned that Palestinian security 
forces had violated human rights and cir-
cumvented the Basic Law through extra-
judicial arrest campaigns and detention 
without a court order, as well as through 
torture and ill-treatment at PA detention 
centres. Following the brutal crackdown 
on protestors in Ramallah between June 
and July of 2012, an Amnesty International 
report argued that, ‘The brutality that fol-
lowed was shocking even by the standards 
of the PA security forces, whose use of exces-
sive force on previous occasions and abuses 
against detainees had already earned them 
an unenviable reputation at home and inter-
nationally’ (Amnesty International 2013: 1).
The practices of the security forces were 
observed by scholars as a reform unfolding 
in an authoritarian context. Nathan Brown 
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argued that Fayyadism had no domestic 
foundation, and that the maintenance of 
the existing institutions was done ‘in an 
authoritarian context that robs the results of 
domestic legitimacy’ (Brown 2011). Hence, 
the entire program was ‘based not simply on 
de-emphasizing or postponing democracy 
and human rights, but on actively denying 
them for the present’ (Brown 2010: 2). This 
made Palestinian authoritarianism different 
from the one under Arafat, insofar as it was 
‘regularised and softened’ and ‘less venal and 
probably less capricious. But it is also more 
stultifying’ (Brown 2010: 10). Hence, ‘the 
main problem with Fayyadism is not the way 
it undermines democracy in the short term 
but in the way it masks the absence of any 
long-term strategy’ (Brown 2009: 5).
Likewise, Yezid Sayigh (2011) argued that 
although the security forces in the West 
Bank received $450 million, their capacities 
were hindered. This was due to the lack of 
ownership in the Security Sector Reform 
process, lack of democratic governance and 
constitutional order, and an exclusive focus 
on technical issues. Sayigh concluded that 
the authoritarian and securitisation trans-
formation in the West Bank will threaten 
not only long-term security, but also the abil-
ity to achieve Palestinian statehood (Sayigh 
2011). Meanwhile, Leech (2012) argued that 
while the process of reforming the security 
sector may manifest a genuine, even exis-
tential, improvement in the lives of people, 
the regime treated this as a starting point for 
increasing authoritarianism, not the reason 
for its conclusion.
Finally, the evolution of security forces 
during the Fayyadism phase was influenced 
by the contested role of the international 
community and their security missions, 
particularly the United States Security 
Coordinator (USSC) and the European Union 
Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police 
Support (EUPOL COPPS). An aid official com-
mented on this by arguing:
On one hand, we demand demo-
cratic processes, transparency and 
accountability and constantly stress 
the importance of human rights. 
But on the other hand, we have for 
the most part been silent about the 
PA’s extra-judicial campaign against 
Hamas. There is a huge contradiction 
in our message (Cited in ICG 2010: 33).
The USSC and the EUPOL COPPS missions 
were part and parcel to the transforma-
tions that took place in the security sphere 
under Fayyadism. As such, they bear a share 
of responsibility in the consequences of 
these security transformations on the lives 
of Palestinian people in the occupied West 
Bank. They are not only new actors, but also 
influential ones that shape discourse and 
strategies, and affect the dimensions of the 
Palestinian struggle. This constituted a major 
transformation in the role of external actors 
from being sponsors of the reform process 
to become real implementers of it through 
real presence on the ground. This shift from 
being observers to implementers had its own 
repercussions on the ownership of the secu-
rity reform processes and opened-up a whole 
new section in the international aid industry 
as a further amplification of securitisation 
and the securitised development process.
However, both the USSC and the EUPOL 
COPPS failed to support democratic gov-
ernance and improve civil oversight and 
accountability due to the technical nature 
of their intervention and their lack of local 
sensitivity. Both bodies focused on a conven-
tional train-and-equip approach which cre-
ated a more skilful security forces, but failed 
to generate a genuine institutional capacity 
to design, plan, and conduct training indig-
enously. Their support paved the way for 
moving toward authoritarianism and the 
establishment of a police state (Rose 2008; 
Sayigh 2011; Kristoff 2012).
Despite technical successes, such as the 
training of more than 3,000 Palestinian 
police officers and supporting the justice 
system, the EUPOL COPPS were criticised 
for their limited and technical scope, for 
their attempts to promote the rule of law 
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in an authoritarian rather than democratic 
manner, and for their role in sustaining the 
occupation through failing to challenge the 
Israeli measures (Bulut 2009; Persson 2011; 
Youngs and Michou 2011; Bouris 2014). 
The USSC was criticised for ‘brainwashing’ 
the young Palestinians that were recruited, 
entrenching the security collaboration with 
Israel at the expense of Palestinian security, 
criminalising resistance, and also for pro-
tecting Israeli security through the creation 
of ‘new Palestinian men’ (as argued by Keith 
Dayton who headed the mission from 2005 
until 2010). The people referred to forces 
that were trained by the USSC as the ‘Dayton 
forces’, and not only were they engaged in a 
brutal crackdown on Palestinians, they were 
also accused of an unprecedented level of 
human rights violations (Byrne 2009; Dayton 
2009; Zanotti 2009, 2010; Thrall 2010).
In sum, the reinvention of Palestinian 
security forces during the Fayyadism era 
(PA’s post-2007 state-building project) con-
stituted a major pillar that demonstrated the 
ability of the PA to govern the Palestinian 
people and build public institutions that 
are able to deliver effectively. However, the 
security reform agenda had detrimental 
consequences for the Palestinian national 
struggle, the everyday security of the people, 
the role of resistance movements, as well as 
intra-Palestinian politics (Amrov and Tartir 
2014a, b).11
Conclusion
This article provided a contextual analysis 
of the evolution and reform processes of 
Palestinian security forces since the estab-
lishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1993 
until the era of Fayyadism. It focused on three 
distinct phases: (i) 1993–1999 and the estab-
lishment and building-up of the PA’s security 
forces in the West Bank and Gaza according 
to Oslo Accords; (ii) 2000–2006 when the 
existing security forces were destroyed in 
the aftermath of the intifada and when the 
non-PA forces filled the security gap; (iii) and 
finally, from 2007 until the departure of 
Fayyad in mid-2013, the phase during which 
the reinvention of the Palestinian secu-
rity forces went through a major security 
reform project. The article concludes that 
the proliferation of the security forces under 
Arafatism resulted in further insecurities for 
the Palestinian people despite the attempt 
to reverse this condition under Fayyadism 
through security reform. This raised new ten-
sions between the PA’s security forces and 
the armed resistance groups and eventually 
manifested in authoritarian transformations. 
Therefore the intended reforms constituted 
another form of institutionalised insecurity, 
but disguised in a state-building and good 
governance project. 
The complex relationship between the PA 
and non-PA security forces and groups in 
the Palestinian context posed an additional 
challenge to the security governance reform 
initiatives. Despite the shifts in the security 
doctrines, what remained constant was the 
problematic reality and fundamental flaw of 
conducting a security sector reform and pur-
suing a disarmament strategy in the absence 
of sovereign authority, and while living under 
a foreign military occupation.
At best, the security reform under 
Fayyadism’s state-building project – and 
the leadership of PA’s president Mahmoud 
Abbas – resulted in better stability and more 
security to Israel and its occupation, but it did 
not result in better security conditions for the 
Palestinian people in the occupied West Bank. 
At worst, the enhanced functionality of the 
PA’s security forces and the reformed style of 
governance that was defined through security 
collaboration with Israel, resulted in creating 
authoritarian transformations and criminalis-
ing resistance against the Israeli occupation, 
and as such directly and indirectly sustained it. 
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Notes
 1 According to the Oslo Peace Accords, the 
West Bank was divided into three areas: 
Area (A) under the civilian and security 
control of the Palestinian Authority (17%); 
Area (B) under Palestinian Authority’s 
civilian control only (24%); and Area (C) 
under full Israeli control (59%).
 2 Interview with Mohammad Dahlan in his 
office in Ramallah, Occupied West Bank, 
June 2010.
 3 Following the 100-Day Plan, the PA 
worked towards implementing a 60-Day 
Action Plan in 2003 and a Six-Month 
Reform Plan in early-mid 2004, and put 
forward a One-Year Reform Action Plan in 
September 2004.
 4 The full title of the roadmap is: A 
Performance-based Roadmap to a 
Permanent Two-State Solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The Quartet 
was headed until mid-2015 by Tony Blair 
and consists of the United Nations, United 
States, European Union, and Russia. 
 5 See the 2005 electoral program of Abbas 
http://president.ps/electoral.aspx; and 
interview with Al-Jazeera in April 2004 
http://bit.ly/1eCnQgi
 6 TIM and PEGASE were the major EU 
mechanisms used to bypass Hamas. They 
aimed to channel aid directly through 
the EU to the beneficiaries’ accounts 
(public servants and security personnel 
salaries) or through the Office of the PA’s 
President. 
 7 A state of emergency can last up to 
thirty days. After that, it may be renewed 
only with the consent of two-thirds the 
Palestinian Legislative Council. Up to 
now Palestinians live under a state of 
emergency, in violation of the Palestinian 
Basic Law. 
 8 West Bank First strategy was largely born 
out of the American and Israeli desire 
with the tacit approval of the PA to either 
isolate Hamas, weaken it, force it to mod-
erate, or defeat it altogether. The aim of 
the strategy is to create two drastically 
different realities in the two Palestinian 
territories, whereby the West Bank pros-
pers and Gaza despairs (for further dis-
cussion see (Samhouri 2007)).
 9 PRDP refers to the Palestinian Reform and 
Development Plan; the 13th Government 
Plan refers to Ending the Occupation: 
Establishing the State plan 2009–2010 
(PA 2009); the NDP refers to the National 
Development Plan 2011–13.
 10 On the achieved successes please refer 
to: UN (2011); World Bank (2011a, b); PA 
(2010a, b, 2011a, b).
 11 For further analysis on the consequences 
of the PA security campaigns between 
2007 and 2013 on the lives of the 
Palestinian people in the occupied West 
Bank, please refer to the author’s forth-
coming article entitled Securitized devel-
opment and Palestinian authoritarianism 
under Fayyadism (Tartir 2015).
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